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Contending the Popular: Party-State and Culture
David S. G. Goodman
Consideration of the “popular” in the contemporary People’s Republic of
China (PRC) immediately confronts the methodological problem of uni-
versalism, as the essays in this issue demonstrate. The popular has certain
connotations in the societies from which our analyses emanate that may or
may not be commonly applied in and to contemporary Chinese society. It
is, for example, often equated with both democratic and demotic develop-
ments, both ofwhich are highly contested discourses in post-MaoChina, not
least because of their apparentWesternness.1The concept of popular culture
may be similarly challenged, though perhaps differently, not least since in
that usage popular is more than simply an adjective, as both Li Hsiao-t’i and
JingWang make explicit.
Academic inquiry, and particularly its language, must necessarily assume
this universalism even as it dissects the popular and associated phenomena in
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order to assess whether and to what extent such assumptions might be justi-
ﬁed.All societies are suis generis.Nonetheless, the application of generalized
concepts and approaches can help characterize a society by identifying the
similarities and differences against such implicit yardsticks. The end result
might conceivably be a justiﬁcation of this universalism, but it is perhaps
more likely to identify differences that will require the amendation of con-
cepts and theories if their general explanatory power is to be maintained.
The constant need to adjust concepts and approaches as the focus of com-
parison widens is particularly important at present when considering the
interactions of political, economic, social, and cultural change in contempo-
rary China. Post-Mao China has coincided with dramatic political changes
internationally, especially during the last decade, that have all but univer-
salized the project of modernization around a single model. It has become
increasingly difﬁcult to inquire, as was once extremely fashionable, about
the convergent or divergent trends in the various patterns of relationships
between state and society.2 Convergence is now more or less assumed as a
corollary of internationalization, with debate focusing on different paths
and stages of development.3 All the same the homogenizing impact of glob-
alizationmay yet prove to be an overstatement, with convergence appearing
either somewhatpremature, or a functionof the level atwhichgeneralization
is attempted.
These prefatory comments are in many ways the necessary background
to the question raised by some of the articles in this issue and by discussions
at the workshop where they were ﬁrst presented, as to the relevance of the-
ory developed in a European context of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
social and political revolutions to China’s still–Communist Party state and
largely agrarian version of postsocialism.However, they also highlight some
other key questions that attend the discussion of the development of contem-
porary popular culture, as well as some of the assumptions made in some of
the descriptions of those developments. In particular, they draw attention to
the changing relationships between politics and culture, and the identiﬁca-
tion of new agents of cultural change, as well as to the nature of the Chinese
state’s authoritarianism and the timing of its developmental process.
The post-Mao era, and evenmore the period sinceDengXiaoping and the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched themselves on their reformist
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path at the end of 1978, has seen signiﬁcant changes in the relationship
between politics and culture. Necessarily, this relationship has changed in
response to theCCP’s adjustments to its ideology.However, at the same time
writers, artists, and the producers of culture were not slow to exploit the
opportunities these changes permitted, and indeed by effectively lobbying
ensured increasingly greater scope for their activities.4 Perhaps the most
important change was that which altered the system of political censorship
from an active vetting before publication to a more passive regulation after
the event.5 Particularly during the 1990s, afterDengXiaoping’sExcursion to
the South in 1992 and its provision of further direction to the reform agenda,
culture became less didactic and more concerned with entertainment, more
commercialized and more commercializable.
At the same time, there are also continuities in the relationship between
politics and culture that cross thewatersheds of both 1978 and 1992. Perhaps
themost important is that theCCPhas always been, and remains, concerned
with popular culture. Li Hsiao-t’i’s account of the emergence of a concern
with “proletarian” literature during the 1930s highlights the process that led
the CCP to see the advantages in both using and controlling the content
of popular culture.6 The yangge described by Jing Wang in her article and
practiced by the elderly in Beijing during the 1990s is itself already a dance
form proletarianized and homogenized by the CCP for its own purposes
from a series of different popular origins in North China during the 1940s.7
As Li Hsiao-t’i suggests, this concern precededMao Zedong’s address to the
Yan’an Forum in May 1942. Moreover, as Jing Wang explicates, while the
CCP’s perspectives may have been adjusted during the last twenty years, the
party’s concern with the management and articulation of popular culture
has not changed. Nor, for that matter, has the party closed down its internal
propaganda hierarchy.
Consideration of the mechanics of the relationship between politics and
culture also suggests that there are continuities as well as change. While the
party-state has certainly moved from greater direct involvement in cultural
affairs to greater regulation during the reform era, it would be easy to
overstate its monopoly of cultural production before 1978 and to understate
its involvement during the 1990s. Even at the height of the Mao-dominated
era of China’s politics, creators of culture did not have to be previously
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state-sanctioned in order to have access to public outlets such as museums,
journals, or publishing houses. Unlike in the former USSR, writers, for
example, were not required to bemembers of the ofﬁcial writers’ association
if they wanted to be published. The initiative for writing and translation
was by no means monopolized by the party-state, and, for example, George
Orwell’s 1984was already available inChinese before the reform era started,
having been translated by an English-speaking freelance translator.8
In the reform era the party-state, for its part, has by nomeans surrendered
completely its role as a creator of culture of all kinds. In part this is a qual-
itative argument. The electronic media—television in particular—became
considerably more accessible and dominant during the 1980s, and yet they
remain almost exclusively the province of the party-state.9 In the print me-
dia, the number of journals has certainly increased since themid-1970swhen
every province had a literarymagazine and an “art and culture” journal that
mirrored the national standard-bearers. The largest growth occurred in the
following ten years, and by the mid-1980s there would have been about
seven thousand such magazines.10 Certainly, too, there are now magazines
and journals published outside the resources of the party-state. However,
the party-state remains a signiﬁcant publisher and producer of culture. The
main outlets for writers, for example, remain the party-state’s now much
larger stable of literary magazines and its publishing houses.
The party-state’s inﬂuence is also far from absent, in a number of ways,
in the formation of those new agents of cultural transmission to emerge in
the 1990s. The explosion of popular culture has covered a diverse range of
activities, frompopular religions and the popularization of religion, through
the creation of new forums for popular interactions, such as private restau-
rants, to popmusic andmagazines. The commercial environment is amajor
stimulus, and inmost cases new companies have been established to develop
these activities.11
Few of the new agents of cultural change have had no connectionwith the
party-state. Many have worked in the party-state and taken their connec-
tions, and sometimes their training and expertise, in an appropriate activity
into the nonstate sector. Particularly during the late 1980s and into the early
1990s, and especially in south and east China, as the economy began to
grow, many local ofﬁcials found themselves losing ground economically to
Goodman Party-State and Culture 249
their peers. One strategy for some was to experiment in the market sector
of the economy, and many (though by no means all) private restaurateurs
came into their new roles in that way. Sometimes, too, economic pressures
convinced ofﬁcials in the party-state that with their managerial and other
skills they could do better in the market. In Shanxi, the daily newspaper
Life of the City is produced by a former division-level cadre in the Gen-
eral Ofﬁce of the Taiyuan CCP Committee, and Good Friends comes from
a publishing company started by journalists and ofﬁcials from the Shanxi
Daily.
Many, too, are the relations, often the children, of ofﬁcials of theparty-state
who build on their and their relatives’ inﬂuence to develop their enterprises.
A Buddhist advisory service was developed by the son of the mayor of
a district-level city, who moreover was able to establish his enterprise in
a building owned by the provincial committee of the CCP. A pop music
producer’s father had been party secretary of a rural district. So strong and
transferable are these family connections that the children themselves can
forswear membership in the CCP or positions in the party-state. Having
a father who had been a long-term village leader, or senior cadre, in a
provincial department makes party membership unnecessary and, indeed,
for cultural activists runs the possibility of being counterproductive.
However, the relationship between new cultural activities and the party-
state is not just associational in those fairly obvious ways. (After all, where
elsewouldoneexpectwell-educated, administratively competentnewagents
of cultural change to come from?) New cultural activities tend to have even
closer structural relationships with the party-state. The party-state has not
disappeared from economic interaction with society; it has simply adjusted
the level at which those interactions take place. Local government nowplays
a central role in China’s socioeconomic development. For cultural activities,
as for economic enterprises, local government provides access to capital
(funds, equipment, and buildings), labor, and political protection. Partly for
a share of equity (and in order to generate income) and partly because it feels
happier with corporatism at the local level (where it can claim a monitoring
inﬂuence, particularly in the face of questions or difﬁculties from superior
ofﬁcials), local government in its turn ispressured to cooperate.Thebooming
collective sector of the economy is largely at the level of local government
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and ensures ﬁnancing and a network of inﬂuence to support activities that
want to grow beyond the small scale of private enterprise.
These observations about the continued inﬂuence of the party-statewould
seem to conﬁrm the arguments that suggest that the popular “from below”
aspects of the drive for popular culture have been subverted “from above” in
the 1990s. Certainly, as Jing Wang argues in her article, the party-state has
developed a new ruling technology that seems designed not to let popular
culture just be. However, as always in studying the contemporary PRC as
it evolves, there is a need to stand back a bit. The party-state’s aims may
be clear, but they, too, can be thwarted by the very social processes it seeks
to manage. Social and even political groups may be complicit in their own
management through an evolving corporatism, but the net result is likely to
be a synthesis of their interactions with the party-state. There may be few
challenges to the existence of the party-state, but there are no guarantees that
its agenda will be implemented at any given time, or at least not necessarily
in the way that was originally intended.
The party-state’s deliberate creation of provincial and regional cultures at
the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, and their subsequent
development, has been instructive in this regard.12 To encourage economic
reform and local initiative, many provincial leaders purposefully encour-
aged the development of provincial and local cultures. Local histories and
collections of local culture were published; local traditions were rediscov-
ered and often commercialized themselves; and considerable emphasis in
public rhetoric was placed on local identity and sense of place, particularly
that of the province. Given the administrative origins of provinces, therewas
always likely to be an element of risk in this strategy. Few provinces had that
kind of cultural identity beforehand. On the contrary, most provinces were
administrative units intended as agents of central control. Their boundaries
more usually cut across social and cultural patterns of interaction.13
Across the provinces, the results of this strategy were verymixed. In a few
provinces, the strategy would have to be regarded as successful. In Shanxi,
talking about a provincial culture united a number of disparate local cultures
and provided a conﬁdence previously lacking, so that its annual economic
growth has regularly outpaced the national rate.14 In part the success of the
cultural strategy can be attributed to the work of the republican era warlord
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Yan Xishan, who had provided a provincial consciousness absent in many
otherprovinces.15 Inpart, success canalsobe attributed to a strategy explicitly
based on recognizing the province’s more local cultures and emphasizing
their commonalities.
However, in more provinces the emphasis on provincial identity and local
culture was less successful in achieving the aims of the party-state. In some
it backﬁred on those provincial leaderships who had introduced such strate-
gies, and in others it exacerbated social and political problems. In Hubei,
for example, an already unpopular provincial leader managed to alienate
signiﬁcant social and political interests andwas forced to resign.16 In Jiangxi
the attempt to develop a provincial identity was always ﬁghting a hard battle
against the distinct local cultures, each of which looks more fondly to one of
its four neighboring provinces than toward the collective entity. The result
by the mid-1990s was an increase in the strength of these local identiﬁca-
tions, with provincial affairs dominated by their interactions.17 In Hainan,
new emphases on the province merely sought to highlight tensions among
the various communities—dividedby language, economic activity, and often
ethnicity as well as a generation of migration—each of which claimed to be
the authentic provincial voice.18
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Government from Below:
The State, the Popular, and the Illusion of Autonomy
Ralph A. Litzinger
To write a history of the culture of the popular classes exclusively from inside those
classes, without understanding the ways in which they are constantly held in relation
with the institutions of dominant cultural production, is not to live in the twentieth
century.-Stuart Hall
In his seminal essay "Notes on Deconstructing the 'Popular,' " Stuart Hall
argued that the study of popular culture should always begin with what
he termed "the double movement of containment and resistance." Hall
reminds us that throughout the long transition from agrarian to industrial
capitalism, there was a continuous struggle over the languages, traditions,
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